

7 December 1949  
(2nd DRAFT)

ASSUMPTIONS FOR CIA EMERGENCY PLANNING

THE PROBLEM

1. The problem is to establish the assumptions necessary to give specific purpose and direction to CIA emergency planning.

DISCUSSION

2. The necessary assumptions can be derived without further ado from available knowledge of:

- a. The related planning which is taking place under NSRB direction for the Government as a whole.
- b. The present state of CIA emergency planning.
- c. The present concepts of the wartime status of CIA.
- d. The operating requirements of CIA.

CONCLUSIONS

3. Assumptions should be adopted to the effect that:

(1) Washington will remain the normal seat of government during peace and war.

(2) In the event that Washington must be evacuated temporarily as the seat of government on account of a disaster, the city will be re-established as the seat of government as soon as possible.

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EMERGENCY MUSTER AND RENDEZVOUS POINT(S)

THE PROBLEM

1. The problem is to select an adequate number of suitable emergency muster and rendezvous points, and to draft instructions to be disseminated to all CIA personnel in Washington, prescribing what action individual employees are to take immediately following a disaster.

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DISCUSSION

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LINE OF SUCCESSION OF AUTHORITY FOR  
ALL ELEMENTS OF CIA

THE PROBLEM

1. The problem is to establish lines of succession of authority, to be followed in the replacement of disaster casualties, for the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency and of its elements.

DISCUSSION

2. In establishing emergency lines of succession for CIA, it is impractical simply to follow the rule of seniority, for the following reasons:

a. Not all individuals who are relatively senior in the Agency or one of its elements are currently in positions where they acquire the experience and knowledge necessary to their taking over the higher key positions at a crucial time.

b. Conversely, there are certain individuals in CIA whose present positions automatically qualify them to step up to certain higher positions.

3. In connection with Subparagraph 2b above, the thought may arise that it should be possible to establish a rule that the incumbents, whoever they be, of certain positions would pass automatically to designated higher positions, and so on. An examination of this thought causes it to be discarded. There is nothing to insure that the incumbent of any particular position will always, over a period of time, be an individual qualified in every way to take over a given higher position. Also, there is no rule which can be established which can help to determine which job, of several with similar potential, best qualifies the incumbent for a particular higher job. Decisions to establish a job to job sequence without regard for personalities, would perforce be just arbitrary, with all the disadvantages of a decision of such nature.

4. The correct conclusion appears to be that the establishment of lines of succession must be based on actual selection by name, individuals being considered in order of seniority.

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to go in establishing lines of succession. Should they be established for every element of the Agency, down to sections? How deep should lines of succession be? The key to the answers to these questions appears to lie in the fact that all the Washington personnel of CIA are equally vulnerable to disaster. In the event of a disaster such as visualized in Assumption (3)

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INTERIM OPERATING PROCEDURES

THE PROBLEM

1. The problem is to establish operating procedures for the Central Intelligence Agency for the period after a disaster until such time as the Agency were capable of full-scale operations as required by the situation then prevailing.

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